The widespread adoption of digital video techniques has generated a requirement for authenticity verification in applications such as criminal evidence, insurance claims and commercial databases. This work addresses problems that arise from a spatial digital watermarking technique developed to detect frame reordering and dropping scenarios. It discusses the differences between mutual frame types at different bit-rates. Many papers consider detection after MPEG-2 decoding as a naive approach.
INTRODUCTION
Authentication has always been an important issue throughout history [1] . Now, in the digital world of imagery and video, the aid of digital watermarks is useful to establish authenticity. ' The attacks on video signals fall into two categories, [2] : The first type covers the attacks that tamper with the intensity patterns of video, e.g. compression, noise, etc .. While the second type, time-base tampering, disrupts the frame sequencing, e.g. frame cuts, swapping, deletion or foreign frame insertion. Digital watermarking becomes a useful technique to stamp imperceptible labels to the monitoring content, allowing detection of time-base tampering.
There are several ways to embed and detect a robust watermark in a compressed video sequence. [5] propose a video watermarking method that embeds information in the motion vectors. This method is not robust to re-encoding. Linnartz et al. [6] embed information by modifying the picture type of a GOP and so creating irregular GOP structures. This method is not useful for time-base attacks as it is not robust to re encoding and it contradicts efforts to improve coding efficiency. Deguillaume et al. [7] propose a method to embed a spread-spectrum watermark by employing a 3-D DFT. By using a template, their scheme can invert effects of frame-rate, aspect-ratio changes and frame re-scaling.
Spatial watermarks are easy and fast to embed but are generally considered fragile [5] . In this work, we show that it is possible to recover spatial watermarks from compressed video at different locations and different bit rates. In section 2, we briefly introduce a spatial watermarking scheme where the detection is based on a similarity check between the original watermark and the watermarked image in question. In section 3, we extend the scheme to MPEG-2 compressed video and discuss the drawbacks of the embedding methods. In section 4, we compare and discuss the different detection locations and examine the differences between frame types and sequence contents. We present our conclusions in section 5. 
The log of the variance of neighboring pixels within a window controls the strength factor a. Because the eye responds logarithmically to changes of intensity, see [9] . £ (E9t� ,£«1) limits pwithin practical range.
Pi =log(var(window( I i,n»+e) (2.2) a.=C.
The width, n, of the square window, affects the distortion level of edges and small objects. The wider the window size, the more blurry the edges. (Eq. 2.3) normalizes the output of the variance and C represents a user-defined constant. This constant is higher for video watermarking as the human visual system decreases its sensitivity with increasing motion [10] , typically C = 10.
Watermark detection
The detection algorithm is a cross-correlation process.
From the possibly corrupted image {., the spatial pixel information is correlated with each one of the possible embedded watermarks using the following rule [11] :
N The watermark W for which the detector response is the highest, is assumed to be the embedded mark. To be more resilient to errors, the watermark is embedded twice: once in its normal state and once in its inverted state. Equation.
2.1 then becomes:
L represents the mid pixel number. The summa tion of the two detector responses creates a larger SNR between the cross-correlation of the actual. embedded Wand /'W and the cross-correlation of the set of random watermarks and I' ...
SPATIAL DIGITAL WATERMARK. FOR MPEG-2
Each frame of a video sequence is equally important for authenticity verification applications. Watermarking each frame with a different watermark can prevent watermark leakage [12] . The algorithm described in section 2 is adapted to enable video watermarking as follows. The pseudo-random watennar k seed number represents the frame number. The comparison between the extracted seed The round-robin embedding scheme of the labels is a trade off between computation time (the larger the modulus base the more cross·correlation values need to be generated) and detection accuracy. The latter depends on the motion entropy of the sequence. Normally the removal of one frame in an active video sequence is noticeable.
However, security camera footages are mostly non-active so that the removal of a few frames can become unnl:)ticeable. To speed up the detection process, the number of checked watennarks has to be reduced to a random subset of watermarks including the possible embedded watermark.
Watermark embedding location
There are three distinct locations to embed the watermark:
before, in or after the motion compensation loop.
Embedding of the watermark in the motion compensation loop (see Figure 1 , location 2), using the DFD signal is possible as the DFD signal hardly ever becomes exactly zero. There is always observation noise, occlusion or variation of scene illumination between adjacent frames. Embedding in the same domain as compression (location 3) has proven to be an advantage [1] . The coefficients that become small due to the quantization process can be avoided by the watermarking system in order not to distort the Variable Length Coding (VLC). Embedding of the watermark in the motion vector information (by adding a small change, (location 5» is not robust to the re-encoding process and hence not favorable. Every watermark embedding system after the motion compensation loop needs a drift-compensation system to neutralize the propagation of errors. (Figure 1, location 4) Embedding of a watennark in the DFD signal is less robust to compression as there is less 'space' available to host the watermark. In addition, the rate/buffer control system adjusts the quantizer step size, which results in a larger deterioration of the reference frame at lower bit rates. This results in a low auto-correlation of the DFD IV -3458 signal at different bit-rates as the motion vectors are pointing to a different location in the reference frame, Hence, embedding a watermark in the DFD signal is less robust to bit-rate changes. Inserting a watermark before the motion compensation loop (see Figure I , location I) is more favorable than watermarking the poorly correlated DFD signal.
IMPLEMENTATION AND SIMULATION

RESULTS
The tag embedding experiment has been carried out on 18 QCIF test sequences (30 frames/sec) compressed with MPEG-2 at different bit-rates: 5Mbps, 2Mbps, 1 Mbps, 512kbps, 448kbps, 384kbps, 320kbps, 256kbps, 192kbps, 128kbps and 100kbps. A 300-frame sequence generates 21 I-frames, 80 P-frames and 199 B-frames. The strength factor a is frame type independent. The detection of the embedded label happens in two different locations: once in the DFD and once in the reconstructed signal.
Detection in DFD signal
The detection performance is proportional to the watermark/image ratio. This number describes the ratio of watermark versus host signal energy, the higher this ratio, the lower the detection failure and visa versa. Reducing the image energy can increase the watermark/image ratio by detecting the watermark in the DFD signal (where the predicted frame is removed from the current frame). The DFD signal of P and B-frames also contain the propagated watermark from the reference frame flipped by 1800• This phase shift results in a negative cross-correlation and does not influence the performance of the detector. Non-active video sequences (akiyo, grandma and salesman) perform better in comparison. with active video sequences (cricket, dive and foreman). Because the motion estimation is very effective and the motion compensation function reduces almost all the image content of the frame, Datac:tIon In -.tructlld frame Figure 3 . Correlation detector in reconstructed frame for different bit-rates and test sequences this results in a high watermark/image ratio, hence better performance. Detection in the DFD signal is illustrated in Figure 2 . It describes the relative failure, the ratio of frames from which the watermark could not be detected versus the total number of frames, in function of the tested sequences. Each graph depicts the performance of different frame types at different bit-rate. The detector is more accurate for B-frames at high compression ratios than P-frames because B-frames are better predicted.
(Their prediction is bi-directional.) This is illustrated in Figure 2 for 5Mbps. However, P-frames have a higher detection accuracy at lower bit-rates due to the IPB quantizer mode. B-frames are more heavily quantized than P-frames resulting in a poor watermark/image ratio. This is shown in Figure 2 for I 28kbps. The detection system in the DFD signal is only reliable for high bit-rates, e.g. 5Mbps.
Detection in the reconstructed signal
Prior to detection of the embedded frame number, the local mean is removed from the reconstructed frame. This process can be modeled as a high-pass filter and reduces the interference (cross-talk) between the watermark and the host signal, which is more concentrated in the low frequencies. Equation (2.4) then becomes:
, .
N -
represents the local mean from a 3x3 neighborhood of pixels, The size of this neighborhood represents the cut off frequency of the high-pass filter,
The detection reliability in the reconstructed frame depends on the frame type, sequence content and bit-rate. Figure 3 describes the relative failure of different test-sequences for I, P and B-frames compressed at IOOkbps and 256kbps respectively. The performance of the detector when extracting the frame number in the reconstructed signal depends on the correct watermark/image ratio. This correct-watermark level is reduced by the level of compression or by the propagat ion of the reference frame watermark.
The loss of the watermark in I-frames is only due to compression. Complex sequences (highly textured, camera panning, ... ), which are more prone to quantization, have a higher relative failure rate. This can be observed in Figure 3 for the dive, stefan, foreman and table test sequence. (dotted line)
The loss of the watermark in P and B-frames are due to compression or propa gation of the reference frame watermark. One can distinguish 3 different cases. Firstly, the non-active test-sequences with a high textured background are susceptible to the propagation. Due to the small motion vectors, the negligible shift of the propagated reference watermark reduces the correct-watermark/image ratio, which result in a high relative failure rate. One can observe this in the container, salesman, sean, silent and weather test-sequences of Figure 3 .
Secondly, the non-active test-sequences with a low textured background are also prone to propagation. However, the low textured regions of these sequences do not contain a strong presence of the reference frame watermark, hence does not significantly influ ence the correct-watermark/image ratio. These sequences result in a low relative failure at a bit-rate of 256kbps for B-frames and 128kbps for P-frames. Examples are: akiyo, carphone, grandma and.
Finally, the active test-sequences with a high textured background are more susceptible to compression than to propagation, because the large motion vectors de synchronize the propagated reference frame watermark.
This result in a low relative failure at a bit-rate of 192kbps. Examples are cricket, dive, foreman and stefan. Figure 4 . depicts the frame order as a function of the extracted label for a simulated time-base tampering scenario of the 'Cricket' test sequence compressed at 192 kbps. Ten frames were re-ordered at the beginning and dropped at the end. In addition, two frames were flipped in the middle of the sequence. The round-robin modulus base was set to 100. The tampering can be reversed to a certain extent from the extracted information of Figure 4 . Ideally, a straight line is desirable.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper establishes a link between detection failure and sequence content. It explains the differences in detection performance at different bit-rates between mutual frame types and detector locations. The proposed method has successfully been tested on 18 different test sequences, allowing detection of time-base tampering in video authentication. 
